Seminar Series in Analytic Philosophy 2024-25: Session 8 - Consciousness and Solipsism by Giovanni Merlo (University of Geneva)
In a characteristically thorny passage of his Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein invites us to envisage a language for speaking of pain and other sensations of which any person whatever could, in principle, be the ‘centre’. In this language, one wouldn’t say ‘I am in pain’, but ‘There is pain’ or ‘It hurts’. And, when speaking of individuals other than oneself, one wouldn’t say ‘A is in pain’, but ‘A is behaving as the Centre does when there is pain’ or ‘A is behaving as the Centre does when it hurts’. In this talk, I will identify some aspects of our ordinary conception of pain and other sensations that appear to make the way of speaking about them envisaged by Wittgenstein, not only perfectly appropriate, but also inescapable. I will then outline a metaphysical view that, instead of revising those aspects of the ordinary conception, tries to accommodate them without falling into the pitfalls of solipsism.
Duração: 2.00 Horas
Instituição: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
Tipo de Evento: Conferência | Colóquio | Palestra
Presença: Presencial
Máximo de Participantes por Sessão: 25
Coordenadas GPS: 38.7538428, -9.1582663047538
Localidade: Lisboa
Concelho: LISBOA
Distrito: LISBOA
Mais informações: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-2024-25-session-8/
Data:
22-11-2024 04:00 